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Abstract
Most of privacy protection studies for textual data focus on re-
moving explicit sensitive identifiers. However, personal writ-
ing style, as a strong indicator of the authorship, is often ne-
glected. Recent studies on writing style anonymization can
only output numeric vectors which are difficult for the recip-
ients to interpret. We propose a novel text generation model
with the exponential mechanism for authorship anonymiza-
tion. By augmenting the semantic information through a RE-
INFORCE training reward function, the model can generate
differentially-private text that has a close semantic and similar
grammatical structure to the original text while removing per-
sonal traits of the writing style. It does not assume any condi-
tioned labels or paralleled text data for training. We evaluate
the performance of the proposed model on the real-life peer
reviews dataset and the Yelp review dataset. The result sug-
gests that our model outperforms the state-of-the-art on se-
mantic preservation, authorship obfuscation, and stylometric
transformation.
Introduction
Privacy has become a vital issue in online data gathering
and public data release. Various machine learning models
and privacy preservation algorithms have been studied for
relational data, network graph data (Chen et al. 2014), etc.
However, the studies on privacy protection for textual data
are still preliminary. Most related works only focus on re-
placing the sensitive key phrases in the text (Vasudevan and
John 2014) without considering the author’s writing style,
which is indeed a strong indicator of a persons identity. Even
though some textual data, such as double-blind academic re-
views, is released anonymously, the adversaries may recover
the author’s identity using the personal traits in writing. Sty-
lometric techniques (Koppel, Schler, and Argamon 2011)
can identify an author of the text from 10,000 candidates.
They are effective across online posts, articles, emails, and
reviews (Zheng et al. 2006; Ding, Fung, and Debbabi 2015;
Ding et al. 2017). Nevertheless, traditional text sanitiza-
tion methods (Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008) focus on
anonymizing the contents, such as patient information, in-
stead of the writing style, so they are ineffective against
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writing style analysis. The original author can be eas-
ily re-identified even if protected by these traditional ap-
proaches (Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008).
Only a few recent studies focus on authorship anonymiza-
tion, aiming to hide the personal traits of writing style in the
given textual data. Anonymouth (McDonald et al. 2012) is
a semi-automatic framework that offers suggestions to users
to change their writing style. Yet, this framework is not prac-
tical since it requires two datasets as a reference to compare
the change in writing style. Also, the user has to make all the
final modification decisions. SynTF (Weggenmann and Ker-
schbaum 2018) represents a line of research that protects the
privacy of the numeric vector representation of textual data.
It adopts the exponential mechanism for a privacy guarantee,
but the output is only an opaque term frequency vector, not
an interpretable text in natural language. Furthermore, its to-
ken substitution approach does not consider the grammatical
correctness and semantic.
Style transfer is another line of research that tries to gen-
erate text with controllable attributes (Shen et al. 2017;
Hu et al. 2017; Sennrich, Haddow, and Birch 2016). Rep-
resentative models (Hu et al. 2017) can control the senti-
ment and tense of the generated text. However, they do not
modify the personal traits in writing. Their applications on
sentiment and word-reordering correspond to the content of
the text more than the writing style. We argue that their defi-
nition of styles, such as sentiment or tense, is different from
the personal linguistic writing characteristics that raise pri-
vacy concern. A4NT (Shetty, Schiele, and Fritz 2018) is a
generative neural network that sanitizes the writing style of
the input text. However, it requires text samples to be labeled
with known author identities. It is not applicable to any tex-
tual data. Without using any privacy model, A4NT does not
provide any privacy guarantee.
To address the aforementioned issues, we propose an
Embedding Reward Auto-Encoder (ER-AE) to generate
differentially-private text. Relying on differential privacy, it
protects the author’s identity through text indistinguishabil-
ity without assuming any specific labels, any parallel data
or any assumption on the attacker. It guards the privacy
of the data against the worst information disclosure sce-
nario. ER-AE receives the original text as input, extracts la-
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tent features, and generates a new text using the exponen-
tial mechanism. We propose a REINFORCE (Sutton et al.
2000) embedding reward function to augment the semantic
information during the text generation process. The model
can keep the generated text a close semantic and sentiment
similarity to the original while providing a guarantee that
one can hardly recover the original author’s identity. Unlike
the aforementioned authorship anonymization works, ER-
AE produces human-friendly text in natural language. Our
key contributions are summarized as follows:
• The first differentially-private authorship anonymization
model that can generate human-friendly text in natural
language, instead of a numeric vector.
• A novel combination of the exponential mechanism with
a sequential text generator, providing a privacy guarantee
through a sampling process.
• A new REINFORCE reward function that can augment
the semantic information through external knowledge, en-
abling better preservation of the semantic and sentiment
similarity in the data synthesis process.
• Comprehensive evaluations on two real-life datasets,
namely NeurIPS & ICLR peer reviews and Yelp product
reviews, show that ER-AE is effective in obfuscating the
writing style, anonymizing the authorship, and preserving
the semantics of the original text.
All the source code and data are publicly accessible for re-
producibility and transferability.1
Related Work
Differential Privacy. Recently, differential privacy has re-
ceived a lot of attention in the machine learning commu-
nity. The differentially-private deep learning model (Abadi
et al. 2016b) is designed to preserve the training data privacy.
Their purpose is to guarantee that publishing the trained
model does not reveal the privacy of individual records. Our
purpose is different. We publish the differentially-private
data generated by the model, rather than the model itself.
Most existing models for differentially-private data release,
such as (Chen et al. 2014) , focus on different types of data
rather than text. One recent work (Weggenmann and Ker-
schbaum 2018) aims to protect privacy in text data using
the exponential mechanism. However, it releases the term
frequency vectors instead of a readable text. This approach
limits the utility of published data to only the applications
that assume term frequency as features. In contrast, our goal
is to generate differentially-private text in a natural language
without compromising individual privacy.
Controllable Text Generation. Text generation is a
trending topic in machine learning. It aims at generating
a text sample with changed attributes. Sennrich, Haddow,
and Birch propose a model to change the degree of po-
liteness while generating text. Hu et al. combine the varia-
tional auto-encoders (VAE) with generative adversarial net-
work (GAN) to generate a sentence with different sentiment
and tense. A4NT (Shetty, Schiele, and Fritz 2018) can con-
trol the gender and age attributes of the generated text data
1Link temporally hidden due to the double-blind policy.
through a GAN model. Most of the literature on this direc-
tion name different attributes, such as sentiment and tense,
as style. However, these attributes correspond more to the
content itself, rather than the personal writing style. Our fo-
cus is different.
Writing Style Transfer. Studies on writing style trans-
feral try to change the writing style revealed from the text
according to a given author. Shetty, Schiele, and Fritz de-
sign a GAN to transfer Obama’s text to Trump’s style. A
sequence to sequence (seq2seq) model is proposed by Jham-
tani et al. to transfer modern English into Shakespearean
English. Shen et al. design a model with a cross-alignment
method to control the text sentiment while preserving se-
mantic. These models can also be applied in writing style
anonymization. However, these studies require the data to
be labeled with authorship identity. They assume a number
of known authors. In contrast, our differentially-private so-
lution does not assume any label information.
Writing Style Obfuscation. Writing Style obfuscation
studies try to hide the identity of the author. Anony-
mouth (McDonald et al. 2012) is a tool that utilizes JStylo
to generate writing attributes. It gives users suggestions on
which way they can anonymize their text according to two
reference dataset. Kacmarcik and Gamon also propose a
similar architecture to anonymize text, however, instead of
directly changing the text, they all work on the term fre-
quency vector, whose real-life utility is limited. Compared
with semi-automatic methods that require users to make a
decision, our approach directly learns from end to end.
Preliminaries and Problem Definition
Adjacency is a key notion in differential privacy. One of the
commonly used adjacency definition is that two datasets D1
andD2 are adjacent ifD2 can be obtained by modifying one
record in D1 (Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan 2010). Differ-
ential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006) is a framework that pro-
vides a rigorous privacy guarantee on a dataset. It demands
inherent randomness of a sanitization algorithm or genera-
tion function:
Definition 1. Differential Privacy. Two datasets are con-
sidered as adjacent if there is only one single element is dif-
ferent. Let privacy buget  > 0, a randomized algorithm
A : Dn −→ Z. The algorithm A is said to preserve -
differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets D1, D2
∈ Dn, and for any possible set of output Z ∈ im(A):
Pr [A (D1) ∈ Z] ≤ e · Pr [A (D2) ∈ Z] 
It guarantees that the result from a given algorithm A is
not sensitive to a change of any individual record in D. 
denotes the privacy budget, the allowed degree of sensitiv-
ity. A large  implies a higher risk to privacy. However,  is
a relative value that implies different degrees of risk given
different problems (Weggenmann and Kerschbaum 2018).
Adversary Scenario. Generally in an authorship iden-
tification problem, one assumes that the attacker holds an
anonymous text authored by one of the suspects from the
dataset. The attacker aims to infer the true author of the
anonymous text based on a set of reference texts from each
suspect. However, this scenario assumes certain information
on the applicable dataset, such as author labels and the num-
ber of reference text samples. Therefore, following Weggen-
mann and Kerschbaum, we define that any two texts as ad-
jacent datasets.
Adjacency. Any two texts can be considered adjacent in
the strictest scenario that datasetsD1 andD2 both have only
one record, and D2 can be obtained by editing one record
in D1 following Definition 1. With differential privacy, we
can have text indistinguishability: one cannot distinguish the
identity of any text to another. In our case, the identity of
a text corresponds to the author that writes the text. Along
with this, the attacker would fail in the original authorship
identification scenario since the anonymous text is indistin-
guishable from the rest of the dataset.
Fernandes, Dras, and McIver factor in a text’s topic in the
privacy model. However, the approach limits to the datasets
that contain explicit authorship and topic indicators. Our
definition follows Weggenmann and Kerschbaum leading to
the most strict and conservative definition of adjacency.
Definition 2. Differentially-private Text Generation. Let
D denote a text dataset that contains a set of texts where
x ∈ D is one of them and |x|, the length of the text, is bound
by l. Given D with a privacy budget , for each x the model
generates another text x˜dp that satisfies l-differential pri-
vacy. 
Following the above definitions, any two datasets that
contain only one record are probabilistically indistinguish-
able w.r.t. a privacy budget . It directly protects the iden-
tity of an individual record, disregarding if some of the
records belong to the same author or not. It assumes that
every record is authored by a different author, which is the
strictest situation. Technically, the proposed text generation
approach protects the writing style by reorganizing the text,
replacing tokens with different spelling, removing the lexi-
cal, syntactical and idiosyncratic features of the given text.
The above definition is based on SynTF (Weggenmann and
Kerschbaum 2018), but our target is text in natural language
rather than numeric vectors, which is more challenging.
ER-AE for Differentially-private Text
Generation
In this section, we present our ER-AE model (see Figure 1).
ER-AE contains an encoder and a generator. Its encoder
receives a sequence of tokens as input and generates a la-
tent vector to represent the semantic features. The genera-
tor, combined with an exponential mechanism, can produce
differentially-private text according to the latent vector. ER-
AE is trained by combining a reconstruction loss function
and a novel embedding loss function.
Our ER-AE model starts with a basic sequence-to-
sequence (seq2seq) auto-encoder structure. Given a text x,
its tokens 〈x1 . . . xl〉 are firstly converted into a sequence of
embedding vectors 〈Em(x1) . . . Em(xl)〉 by Em : V →
Rm1 , where V is the vocabulary across the dataset and m1
is the embedding dimension. On its top, we apply a bi-
directional recurrent neural network with Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU) (Cho et al. 2014) that leverages both the forward
Algorithm 1 Generation Procedure of ER-AE
Input: Text: x, Parameters: θ, Encoder: Eθ(), Generator:
Gθ(), Privacy budget: .
Produce the latent vector: Eθ(x).
Get probabilities of new tokens: Pr[x˜]← Gθ(Eθ(x)).
for i← 1 to length of x do
Apply exponential mechanism and get: Pr[ε,ρi(x˜i)].
Sample new i-th token: x˜dp[i] ∼ ε,ρi(x˜i).
end for
Output: Differentially-private Text: x˜dp.
and backward information. GRU achieves a comparable per-
formance to LSTM but less computational overhead (Cho et
al. 2014). Then, the produced final state vectors from both
directions, sf and sb, are concatenated and linearly trans-
formed to be a latent vector E(x). m is the hidden state di-
mension for the GRU function.
E(x) = Wh × concat(sf , sb),
where sf , sb ∈ Rm, Wh ∈ Rh×2m
(1)
The generator is another recurrent neural network with
GRU. It generates a text token-by-token. For each timestamp
i, it calculates a logit weight ziv for every candidate token
v ∈ V , conditioned on the latent vector, last original token
xi−1, and the last hidden state si−1 of the GRU function.
ziv = w
>
v GRU(E(x), Em(xi−1), si−1) + bv (2)
Let x˜i denote the random variable for the generated token at
timestamp i. Its probability mass function is proportional to
each candidate token’s weight zti. This is modeled through
a typical softmax function:
Pr[x˜i = v] = exp (ziv) /
∑
v′∈V
exp (ziv′) (3)
A typical seq2seq model generates text by applying
argmaxv∈V Pr[x˜i = v] for each timestamp i. However, this
process does not protect the privacy of the original data.
Differentially-private Text Sampling
To protect an individual’s privacy and hide the authorship
of the original input text, we couple the exponential mecha-
nism (McSherry and Talwar 2007) with the above sampling
process in the generator. The exponential mechanism can
be applied to both numeric and categorical data (Fernandes,
Dras, and McIver 2018). It is effective in various sampling
process for discrete data. It guarantees privacy protection by
injecting noise into the sampling process:
Definition 3. Exponential Mechanism. LetM and N be
two enumerable sets. Given a privacy budget  > 0, a rating
function ρ:M×N → R. The probability density function
of the random variable ε,ρ(m) is described as:
Pr [ε,ρ(m) = n] =
exp
(

2∆ρ(m,n)
)∑
n′ exp
(

2∆ρ (m,n
′)
) (4)
where ∆, the sensitivity, means the maximum difference of
rating function values between two adjacent datasets, and
m ∈M, n ∈ N . 
Input
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Figure 1: Overall architecture of ER-AE.
The exponential mechanism protects privacy through dis-
turbing the distribution of rating function using , and the
data is randomly sampled based on the disturbed distribu-
tion. This sampling process is -differentially private. Fol-
lowing Weggenmann and Kerschbaum and by swappingM
and N with text dataset D and our vocabulary V Assuming
arbitrary x ∈ D, w ∈ V , our rating function and its sensitiv-
ity for arbitary timestamp i can be described as:
ρi(x,w) =
exp (ziw)∑
w′∈V exp (ziw′)
∈ [0, 1]
∆ρi = max
t∈V
max
x,x′∼D
|ρi(x, t)− ρi(x′, t)|1 ≤ 1
(5)
The rating function seeks alternative tokensw to the original
tokens in the input text by considering the logit weight val-
ues from Eq. 2. It rates w by considering the current context
and encoded latent features. By adopting this rating func-
tion, the sampling process considers both the grammartical
and semantic context to find an alternative token that can
preserve one’s privacy. It is timestamp-specific, and its sen-
sitivity is bounded by 1. Let ε,ρi(x˜i) denote the random
variable for the generated token at timestamp i. By plugging
our rating function into the exponential mechanism defined
in Eq. 4, we have the probability mass function for ε,ρi(x˜i):
Pr[ε,ρi(x˜i) = v] =
exp
(

2∆ρi(x, v)
)∑
v′ exp
(

2∆ρ (x, v
′)
) (6)
This function models the disturbed probability distribution
for all the alternative token v to replace the original vari-
able x˜i. According to Definition 3, sampling from ε,ρi(x˜i)
for each timestamp i is -differentially private. Recall that
in Definition 1, the timestamp is bound by l. To generate
text x˜dp, the generator samples a token for each timestamp i
through Eq. 6:
x˜dp[i] ∼ ε,ρi(x˜i) for i ∈ [1, l] (7)
The composition theorem (Dwork, Roth, and others
2014) (Theorem 3.16) is an extension to differential pri-
vacy. By repeating n -differentially-private algorithms, the
complete process achieves an n-differential privacy. Algo-
rithm 1 shows the differentially-private text generation pro-
cedure of ER-AE.
Theorem 1. Differetially-Private Text Sampling. Given a
privacy budget  > 0, a sequence length l > 0, the genera-
tor’s sampling function in Eq. 7 is l-differentially-private.
Proof. At the generation stage, for each timestamp i, our
model generates a token by sampling from Eq. 6, which
follows the form of exponential mechanism. This process
achieves -differential privacy as in Definition 3. Every input
of the generator is the original input data xi−1 (see Eq. 2),
which indicates that the outputs of our generator are inde-
pendent. Therefore, Eq. 7 satisfies the sequential composi-
tion theorem. By repeating this process l times, the complete
sampling function provides l-differential privacy. x˜dp is l-
differentially private.
Initial Grammar and Semantic Preservation
To generate a human-friendly text that has a close seman-
tic to the original one, we need to have a high-quality rating
function ρi for Eq. 5. This is achieved by training the ER-
AE model’s encoder to extract semantic information, and its
generator to learn the relationships among the tokens for pre-
diction. We follow an unsupervised learning approach since
we do not assume any label information. First, we adopt the
reconstruction loss function:
Lrecon =
∑
xi∈x,x∈D
− logPr [x˜i = xi] (8)
It maximizes the probability of observing the original token
xi itself for the random variable x˜i. In the recent control-
lable text generation models, the reconstruction loss func-
tion plays an important role to preserve grammar structure
and semantics of input data (Shetty, Schiele, and Fritz 2018;
Shen et al. 2017) when combined with the other loss.
REINFORCE Training for Semantic
Augmentation
Diving into the optimization aspect of the softmax function,
the reconstruction loss function above encourages the model
to produce a higher probability on the original token while
ignoring the rest candidates. It does not consider the other to-
kens that may have a similar meaning under a given context.
This issue significantly limits the variety of usable alterna-
tive tokens. Additionally, this loss function relies on a single
softmax function for multi-object learning, it cannot provide
the expressiveness required by the language model (Yang
et al. 2017). We inspect the candidates and in most of the
cases, only the top-ranked token fits the context in the text.
This is problematic, because the exponential mechanism for
our sampling process also relies on the other candidates to
generate text, as required by Eq. 6.
To address the above issue, we propose a novel embed-
ding reward function using the pre-trained word embed-
dings. Word representation learning models show that dis-
crete text tokens’ semantic can be embedded into a continu-
ous latent vector space. The distance between word embed-
ding vectors can be a reference to measure the similarity be-
tween different words. To encourage our rating function ρi
to learn richer and better substitute tokens, we propose a re-
ward function that leverages the semantics learned from the
other corpus. The text dataset to be anonymized and released
can be small, and the extra semantic knowledge learned from
the other corpus can provide additional reference for our rat-
ing function. This reward function is inspired by the Policy
Gradient loss function proposed by Sutton et al.:
Lembed = −
∑
xi∈x,x∈D
( ∑
v∈Ek(x˜i)
log(Pr[x˜i = v])γ(xi, v)
+
∑
w∼Vk
log(Pr[x˜i = w])γ(xi, w)
)
Generally, this reward function assigns credits to the under-
rated tokens in the reconstruction loss function. Recall that
D is the original dataset and x is one of its texts. At time
step i, first, this reward function assigns rewards to the top-k
selected tokens, denoted as Ek(x˜i), according to probabil-
ity estimates for random variable x˜i in Eq. 3. The rewards
are proportional to their semantic relationship to the original
token xi. It is defined as a function γ : V × V → R
γ(w, v) = min
(
cosine(Em(w), Em(v)), 0.85
)
(9)
The min function avoids the generator focusing only on the
original token. By assigning rewards to Ek(x˜i), it encour-
ages the other candidates having a close semantic to the tar-
geted one. But it may fail to reach infrequent tokens. There-
fore, in the second part of the reward function, we encourage
the model to explore less frequent tokens by random sam-
pling candidates asVk. This design balances the exploitation
(top-k) and the exploration (Vk) in reinforcement learning.
During training, the model will be firstly pre-trained by
minimizing the reconstruction loss in Eq. 8 through the
Adam optimizer, and adopts the embedding reward loss later.
Then, the total loss is:
L = λrecon × Lrecon + λembed × Lembed (10)
Specifically, the reconstruction loss can lead the model to
generate grammar correct text, and the embedding reward
loss encourages the model to focus more on semantically
similar tokens. The balance of the two loss functions are
controlled by λrecon and λembed.
Asymptotic Lower Bound of  for Utility
Following the Theorem 3.6 in (Weggenmann and Ker-
schbaum 2018), we also need a large  to produce mean-
ingful results while output space is large.
Theorem 2. Necessary Condition on . Given rating func-
tion ρ:M×N → R, global sensitivity ∆ and local sensitiv-
ity ∆. For anym ∈ M, τ ∈ [min(ρ(m, .)), max(ρ(m, .))]
where ρ(m, .) stands the rating score of any n ∈ N . Now,
split N into B and B, where B stands for the set of outputs
with score larger than τ and B contains other outputs inN ,
a probability p ∈ [0, 1], we have the necessary condition on
 for Pr [ε,ρ(m) ∈ B] ≥ p, |.| denotes the input size:
 ≥ 2∆/(∆ ln (p/(1− p) ∗ |B|/|B|))
Proof : Let ρmax = max(ρ(m, .))
Let Pr [ε,ρ(m) ∈ B] =
∑
n∈B exp(

2∆ρ(m,n))∑
n∈N exp(

2∆ρ(m,n))
=
∑
n∈B exp(

2∆ρ(m,n))∑
n∈B exp(

2∆ρ(m,n)) +
∑
n∈B exp(

2∆ρ(m,n))
=
1
1 +
∑
n∈B exp(

2∆ρ(m,n))/
∑
n∈B exp(

2∆ρ(m,n))
≤ 1
1 + |B| exp( 2∆ (ρmax −∆))/|B| exp( 2∆ρmax)
= |B|/(|B|+ |B| exp (−∆/2∆)) ≥ p,
We get  ≥ 2∆/∆ ln (p/(1− p) ∗ |B|/|B|). 
Since ∆ ≤ ∆, when p = 1/2:
 ≥ 2 ln ( p
1− p ∗
|B|
|B| ) = 2 ln (
|B|
|B| ) = 2 ln (
|N | − |B|
|B| ).
Usually, the size of B is small while choosing meaningful
outputs with an acceptable τ . According to the above equa-
tions, we have  ∈ Ω(ln(|N |)) to get useful results, where ω
means the asymptotic lower bound. If the vocabulary size is
20,000, then the asymptotic lower bound for  is Ω(9.9) to
produce a meaningful result.
Experiment
All the experiments are carried out on a Windows Server
equipped with two Xeon E5-2697 CPUs (36 cores), 384 GB
of RAM, and four NVIDIA TITAN XP GPU cards. We eval-
uate ER-AE on two different datasets with respect to its ef-
fectiveness for privacy protection and utility preservation.
• Yelp Review Dataset2: All the reviews and tips that come
from the top 100 reviewers ranked by the number of pub-
lished reviews and tips. It contains 76,241 reviews and
200,940 sentences written by 100 authors.
• Academic Review Dataset: All the public reviews from
NeurIPS (2013-2018) and ICLR (2017) based on the orig-
inal data and the web crawler provided by Kang et al.. It
has 17,719 reviews, 268,253 sentences, and the author-
ship of reviews is unknown.
Each dataset is divided into 70/10/20 for
train/dev/evaluation respectively. As mentioned in the
related work discussion, most of the controllable text gener-
ation and style transferal studies rely on known authorship
2http://www.yelp.com/dataset challenge
Table 1: Results for each evaluation metric on both datasets. ↑ indicates the higher the better. ↓ indicates the lower the better.
Yelp (100-author) Conferences’ Dataset
Model USE ↑ Authorship ↓ Stylometric↑ USE↑ Stylometric↑
Original text 1 0.5513 0 1 0
Random-R 0.1183 0.0188 62.99 0.1356 65.624
AE-DP 0.5681 0.0573 18.74 0.5388 13.9
SynTF [2018] 0.1955 0.0518 26.3031 0.2161 25.95
ER-AE (ours) 0.7963 0.0637 14.22 0.7448 10.18
Table 2: The intermediate result of top five words and their probabilities at that the third and the forth generation time steps.
Input: there are several unique hot dog entrees to choose ...
several unique
AE-DP several 0.98, those 0.007, some 0.003, unique 0.99, different 0.0001, new 3.1e-05,
various 0.002, another 0.001 nice 2.5e-05, other 2.1e-05,
ER-AE many 0.55, some 0.20, several 0.14 unique 0.37, great 0.21, amazing 0.15,
different 0.04, numerous 0.03 wonderful 0.1, delicious 0.05
or other labels. They are not applicable to our problem.
Therefore, we pick SynTF (Weggenmann and Kerschbaum
2018) and different generation and sampling models for
evaluation:
• Random Replacement (Random-R): This method gen-
erates a new text by replacing each token in the text by
randomly picking substitution from the vocabulary.
• AE with Differential Privacy (AE-DP): Extended ver-
sion of AE with the added exponential mechanism for text
generation. It does not include the embedding reward.
• SynTF (Weggenmann and Kerschbaum 2018): We di-
rectly generate the tokens through SynTF’s differentially-
private sampling function, without further extraction of
the frequency vector.
For ER-AE, we adopted a two-layers stacked GRU net-
work for both the encoder and the generator. There are 512
cells in each GRU layer. The vocabulary size in all exper-
iments is 20,000, separately built for each dataset. All the
word embeddings in our model come from the pre-trained
BERT embeddings provided by Devlin et al., which has a
dimension of 768 for each embedding. The maximum input
length of our model is 50, the learning rate is 0.001, the k
for embedding reward loss function is 5, the λrecon is 1, the
λembed is 0.5, and the batch size is 128. ER-AE is imple-
mented in TensorFlow (Abadi et al. 2016a), and it uses the
tokenizer in the NLTK library. All the models are evaluated
from three aspects: semantic preservation, privacy protec-
tion, and stylometric changes:
• Semantic Preservation (USE): A pre-trained Univer-
sal Sentence Embedding Similarity (USE) model3 from
Google. It can embed a sentence into a latent vector that
represents its semantics. It is widely used for supervised
NLP tasks such as sentiment analysis. We measure the de-
gree of semantic preservation using the cosine similarity
between the latent vector of the original text and one of
the generated text.
• Privacy Protection (Authorship): A state-of-the-art au-
3https://tfhub.dev/google/universal-sentence-encoder/1
thorship identification neural network model (Sari, Vla-
chos, and Stevenson 2017) to identify the authorship of
generated text. The model is firstly trained on the train-
ing dataset, and the performance is evaluated on the test-
ing set. The author’s privacy is protected if s/he cannot be
identified using authorship identification techniques.
• Stylometric Changes: Well-established stylistic context-
free features such as text length and a number of function
words. We adopt StyloMatrix (Ding et al. 2017) for an
aggregation of features in (Iqbal et al. 2013; Zheng et al.
2006). The feature vector change before/after generation
is measured by the difference in L2 norm.
Quantitative Evaluation (Table 1). With a low utility
(USE) score around 0.2 for both the Yelp review and the
peer review datasets, SynTF, and Random-R generate gram-
matically incorrect text and completely change the mean-
ing of the original one. In contrast, ER-AE without seman-
tic augmentation through REINFORCE training, denoted as
AE-DP, achieves a much higher utility score of around 0.57
and 0.54. The full model ER-AE achieves the highest utility
score of 0.79 for Yelp reviews and 0.74 for peer reviews.
AE-DP, SynTF, and ER-AE all significantly reduce the
chance of a successful authorship identification attack from
55% to around 6% in the Yelp data and introduce a variation
in stylometric features of more than 10 in magnitude in the
peer review dataset. They are all effective and competitive
on removing the personal writing trait from the text data, but
as mentioned above, AE-DP achieves the best and a much
higher utility score. Although Random-R performs slightly
better on privacy protection, its generated texts are almost
irrelevant to the original. Overall, with a competitive per-
formance on anonymization, ER-AE performs significantly
better than all of the other models on utility.
Impact of Embedding Reward. We look into the top five
candidates when the generator sample a token for our model
and the original auto-encoder. Table 3 shows that the em-
bedding reward plays an important role in selecting seman-
tically similar candidates for substitution. AE-DP assigns a
Table 3: Sample sentences generated by models.
Input maybe , i just missed this point in the proof.
SynTF cayman stunts accounts pierced nickel mai aisles maddox possesses ...
Random-R establishments morning intercepted fragrance penny ...
AE-DP maybe , i magnatagatune missed chris point ok the proof loses .
ER-AE maybe , i just missed this restoration in the proof .
Input the novelty is combining several known ideas , which is perfectly acceptable .
SynTF sherwood few mats confronts biceps shuffled whereby magical confirming...
AE-DP the novelty is combining several known ideas , which evocative ’as acceptable .
ER-AE the novelty is decoder-based coincides known ideas , which
read/compose/write perfectly acceptable .
Input attitude of the old asian lady did not help either.
AE-DP luther beliefs replicating softball nuance relate mins not help either .
ER-AE attitude of the old portuguese lady did not salute either .
Input please reduce it or move some of the results to an appendix section.
AE-DP edgeboxes wall-clock 8 small mandarin some scholkopf the poorly to an night youtube2text .
ER-AE please dig it or move confounded of the results to an appendix section .
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Figure 2: Privacy v.s. Utility. Comparing USE similarity (utility), authorship identification error rate (privacy) and Stylometrics
L2 distance (privacy) for different s on applicable datasets.
large probability to the original token and a tiny probability
to the others. If applied with the exponential mechanism, it
is more likely to pick a semantically irrelevant token. ER-AE
shows a smoother distribution on the vocabulary and assigns
higher probabilities to several top-ranked semantically rele-
vant tokens. Its generated candidates are better.
Case Study. Table 3 shows that both SynTF and Random-
R cannot generate human-friendly text. Due to the issue of
reconstruction loss function [8], AE-DP cannot substitute
token with similarly semantic tokens and destroys the se-
mantic meaning. ER-AE, powered by embedding reward,
can substitute some tokens with semantically similar ones:
”asian” is replaced by ”portuguese”, and the whole sentence
still makes sense. Besides, it can preserve the grammatical
structure of the input. However, due to some missing infor-
mation from word embeddings, the model fails to generate
good candidates for sampling. The last sample replaces ”re-
duce” with ”dig”, which changes the semantics of the input.
ER-AE still performs way better than other models.
Utility vs. Privacy. The privacy budget  controls the
trade-off between privacy and utility. A larger  implies bet-
ter utility but less protection on privacy. However, this is
a relative value that implies different degrees of risk given
different problems (Weggenmann and Kerschbaum 2018;
Fernandes, Dras, and McIver 2018).
As shown in Theorem 2, a higher  is intrinsically neces-
sary for a large discrete space, in our case the vocabulary, to
generate meaningful and relevant text. In fact, we have al-
ready significantly reduced the optimal  value of 42.5 used
by Weggenmann and Kerschbaum to around 30 given the
same dataset. One possible way to lower the bound of  is to
directly factor in authorship and utility, such as topics, into
the privacy model. However, it limits applicable to datasets.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel model, ER-AE, to protect
an individual’s privacy for text data release. We are among
the first to fuse the exponential mechanism into the sequence
generation process. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our
model on the Yelp review dataset and NeurIPS & ICLR peer
reviews dataset. However, we also find that ER-AE performs
not very well on long texts. Our future research will focus on
improving the performance on long texts.
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